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Abstract 
If, as expressivists maintain, the function of normative thought and talk is not to 
represent or describe the world, then how can normative judgements be correct or 
incorrect?  In particular, how can I make sense of my own normative fallibility, the 
possibility that my own normative judgements might be mistaken?  In this paper, I 
construct and defend a substantive but non-representational theory of normative 
(in)correctness for expressivists.  Inspired by Blackburn’s (1998: 318) proposal that I 
make sense of my fallibility in terms of the possibility that my judgements might be 
unstable through improvement, my account is designed in the first instance to 
vindicate the expressivist’s conception of the nature of normative inquiry.  I then 
defend the proposal from the charge that it leaves insufficient room for my own 
fallibility, and in particular from Egan’s (2007) argument that it implies a “smug” 
asymmetry between myself and others.  Critical to the response is the appeal to 






Suppose that the function of normative thought and talk – about what is right or 
wrong, good or bad, or what may, ought, or must be done – is to represent or describe the 
world.  Then it’s straightforward to see how normative judgements can be correct or incorrect.  
A normative judgement is correct iff the world is as the judgement represents it as being.  
According to normative expressivism, however, the function of normative discourse is not to 
describe the world, but to express desire-like states – states that serve a motivational, rather 
than representational, role – such as desires, plans, preferences, or attitudes of approval and 
disapproval.1  So how can the expressivist make sense of the idea that there are correct and 
incorrect normative judgements?  Call this the Correctness Challenge. 
 
1 Paradigms include Ayer (1936: ch.6), Stevenson (1944), Blackburn (1984; 1993; 1998), Gibbard (1990; 2003), 
and Ridge (2014).  “Normative judgement” is here a neutral term for the mental state expressed by an atomic 
declarative normative sentence. 
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We can make some progress by appealing to normative (dis)agreement.2  Suppose I 
think that eating meat is wrong.  I thus think that anyone who agrees with me has the correct 
view on the matter and anyone who disagrees with me has the incorrect view.  But this gives 
me no way of making sense of the possibility that anyone I presently agree with (including 
me) is in the wrong, nor that anyone I don’t presently agree with is in the right.  Call this the 
Fallibility Challenge. 
Simon Blackburn (1993: 127) calls “expressions of moral fallibility […] the hardest 
context of all for an [expressivist] to understand.”  He proposes that I make sense of my 
fallibility in terms of the possibility that my judgements might be unstable through improvement.  
While I think that eating meat is wrong, I might change my mind if I were, say, more informed 
or coherent.  Call this the Instability Proposal. 
However, this leaves no room for the possibility that my judgement might be stable 
through all improvements and yet mistaken.  Whether or not such a hypothesis is plausible, 
it seems coherent; so we should be able to make sense of it.  Call this the Limited Fallibility 
Objection.  Moreover, Andy Egan (2007) argues that the Instability Proposal engenders an 
implausible asymmetry between myself and others by my own lights.  Roughly: I cannot make 
sense of the possibility that a judgement of my own is stable and yet mistaken, but I can make 
sense of the possibility that a judgement of yours is stable and yet mistaken.  So, I am immune 
to a kind of error to which you are vulnerable.  Egan, co-opting a turn of phrase from 
Blackburn, labels this asymmetry “unpardonably smug”.  Call this the Smugness Objection. 
This debate has generated a small literature, including responses from Blackburn 
(2009), Lenman (2014), Horgan & Timmons (2015), Ridge (2015), and Bex-Priestley (2018).3  
These responses are inadequate – see §3.2.1.  More importantly, however, neither the 
Instability Proposal nor the Limited Fallibility and Smugness Objections have yet been 
worked out in sufficient detail for us to be able to adjudicate the dispute.  My goal in this 
paper is to do better. 
§1 clarifies the Correctness and Fallibility Challenges, distinguishes three response 
strategies, and makes the case for pursuing the strategy pursued here.  §2 develops a version 
of the Instability Proposal by constructing a general, non-representational theory of normative 
 
2 Assuming the expressivist can make sense of normative disagreement.  Cf. Stevenson (1944: ch.1), Baker & 
Woods (2015).  Compare Egan (2007: 209) on “third-personal” error. 
3 See also Köhler (2015), Beddor (2020), and Lam (2020). 
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(in)correctness that vindicates the expressivist’s conception of the nature of normative inquiry.  
§3 responds to objections, arguing that my theory leaves sufficient room for my own fallibility 
and is immune to the charge of “smugness”.  Central to the response to the Smugness 
Objection is the appeal to indeterminacy in cases of fundamental normative disagreement 
between reasonable normative outlooks.  
 
 
1. EXPRESSIVISM, CORRECTNESS, AND FALLIBILITY 
 
1.1 The Correctness Challenge 
 
Expressivists, unlike representationalist-realists, do not believe in an antecedently given 
normative ontology, in the following sense.  The expressivist argues that we do not get an 
informative explanation of normative discourse if we start out by postulating a realm of 
normative properties, relations, or facts that such discourse functions to describe.  We 
therefore cannot appeal to such an ontology to determine which normative judgements are 
correct. 
Error theorists, of course, say something similar.  But for the error theorist a normative 
judgement is a representational state that would be correct if there were anything in the world 
for it to correspond to.  Because there are no such entities, normative discourse is 
systematically in error.  The expressivist argues that this misunderstands the nature of 
normative judgement.  Normative judgements are not, in the first instance, to be construed as 
representational states, but as motivational, desire-like states.  Since such states do not 
function to represent the world, they cannot be accused of systematically misrepresenting the 
world. 
The worry is that this over-works: it seems to give up the very possibility of failure, and 
with it the possibility of success.  Hence the Correctness Challenge.  If normative discourse 
does not serve a representational function, then success and failure in normative inquiry – 
correctness and incorrectness, truth and falsity – cannot be understood representationally.  
But then how are they to be understood? 
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1.2 Three Responses 
 
There are three possible responses to this challenge:4 
 
(1) Explain normative (in)correctness non-representationally. 
(2) Earn the right to explain normative (in)correctness representationally. 
(3) Reject it as a pseudo-problem. 
 
A non-representational account of normative correctness explains what it is for a 
normative judgement to be correct without appealing to a normative ontology.  As a silly 
example, suppose we say that a normative judgement is correct iff I agree with it.  This is a 
non-representational account of correctness, and thus one the expressivist is entitled to.  But 
it is obviously implausible: among other things, it entails that I cannot be mistaken about 
normative matters.  The Fallibility Challenge thus emerges as a constraint on strategy (1): a 
non-representational explanation of normative (in)correctness needs to leave sufficient room 
for my own fallibility.  (This is intentionally vague: how much room is “sufficient” is a live 
question with which we’ll engage below.) 
In §§2-3, I develop a non-representational theory of normative (in)correctness that, I 
argue, satisfies this constraint.  Those convinced of the interest of this strategy can skip to §2.  
In the rest of this section, I explain why I prefer strategy (1) to strategies (2) or (3), and why 
advocates of other strategies should be interested in the discussion below anyway. 
 
1.3 Strategy (2) 
 
The contemporary expressivist may not start by postulating a normative ontology or 
construing normative judgements as representational states, but nor does she typically deny 
that there are normative properties, relations, facts, or beliefs.  The now-orthodox move is to 
 
4 Besides denying the presupposition that there are (in)correct normative judgements (Ayer 1936: 110-111).  
Failure to explicitly distinguish these responses often complicates discussion.  Early Blackburn (e.g. 1984: ch.6), 
for instance, is plausibly construed as pursuing strategy (1).  Egan (2007) seems to construe Blackburn’s (1998: 
318) later statement in this way too.  Part of Blackburn’s (2009: 207) response is that he is in fact interested in 
strategy (3).  Köhler (2015) rightly points out that Egan’s Smugness Objection recurs when Blackburn is 
interpreted this way. 
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“earn the right” to this “realist”-sounding talk.5  Perhaps, then, in earning the right to talk of 
normative facts and beliefs, the expressivist will ipso facto earn the right to a representational 
explanation of normative (in)correctness.  This is strategy (2). 
Whether this works turns on how we go about earning the right to realist-
representationalist talk.  The most prominent approach appeals to deflationism or minimalism 
about the relevant terminology.6  The blueprint comes from deflationism about truth, which 
postulates a strong equivalence between ‘It is true that p’ and ‘p’,7 such that ‘It is true that 
eating meat is wrong’ is, more or less, just another way of saying ‘Eating meat is wrong’.  So, 
in explaining what it means to say that eating meat is wrong (as the expression of a desire-like 
state), the expressivist ipso facto explains what it means to say that it is true that eating meat is 
wrong – and so is entitled, via existential generalisation, to say that there are normative truths.  
Through similar equivalence claims, the expressivist may be entitled to talk of normative 
properties, facts, and beliefs: if, e.g., we say that ‘a instantiates the property of Fness’, ‘It is a 
fact that a is F’, and ‘It is correct to believe that a is F’, are all equivalent to ‘a is F’. 
Now, if I think that eating meat is wrong, then deflationism entitles me to say that it is 
a fact that eating meat is wrong.  But this gives me no way of making sense of the possibility 
that it is not a fact that eating meat is wrong, or that it is a fact that eating meat is not wrong, 
or generally that the normative facts are other than I take them to be.  So, this way of earning 
the right to talk of normative facts gives me no way to make sense of my own fallibility – it is 
no better off that the crude non-representational account from §1.2.  This is disappointing, but 
unsurprising.  The core claim of deflationism is precisely that talk of “truth”, “facts”, etc. is 
not suited to do substantive explanatory work, but merely allows me to re-state my first-order 
normative judgements in novel terms; i.e., to say what I could already say in a new way.  So, 
unless I can already make sense of my normative fallibility, deflationism is by its nature 
impotent to help.8 
 
5 I avoid the label ‘quasi-realism’ to avoid confusion.  Despite Blackburn coining the term before being 
convinced by deflationism (e.g. Blackburn 1984), deflationism is sometimes taken to be essential to quasi-
realism.  As highlighted here, this is just one (prominent) approach. 
6 See Dunaway (2010) for a presentation of the “general minimalist strategy”. 
7 E.g., synonymy, or at least analytical, conceptual, or cognitive equivalence.  See e.g. Ayer (1936: 85-86), Field 
(1994: 405), Horwich (1998: 4-5). 
8 Incidentally, this shows that discussions of the “Problem of Creeping Minimalism” (cf. Dreier 2004) – which 
maintains that minimalism makes it hard to distinguish expressivism from realism – often move too quickly.  
From the fact that the expressivist is entitled to say that there are normative facts, it does not follow that she 
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However, it’s hard to see how else to pursue strategy (2): a more substantive, non-
representational account of, say, normative truth or correctness would be an instance of 
strategy (1). 
 
1.4 Strategy (3) 
 
There may, however, be a role for deflationism in strategy (3).  If, for instance, ‘it is 
correct to believe that p’ just means what ‘p’ means, then the following questions become 
equivalent: 
 
(A1) What makes it the case that it is (in)correct to believe that eating meat is wrong? 
(A2) What makes it the case that eating meat is (not) wrong? 
 
And (A2) is arguably not a metanormative question at all, but a first-order normative 
question; and so not something the expressivist qua expressivist owes us an answer to.  So, the 
expressivist might deny that she can make sense of the Correctness Challenge as distinct from 
a first-order normative issue.  That’s strategy (3). 
This is in keeping with the expressivist’s “sideways-on” methodology: the expressivist 
explains what it is to think that φ-ing is wrong; but she denies that there is any interesting 
“metaphysical” question about what it is for φ-ing to be wrong besides the first-order question: 
is φ-ing wrong?  Likewise, the expressivist might say that to think that a judgement is 
(in)correct is just to (dis)agree with it; but there is no interesting “metaphysical” question 
about what it is for a judgement to be (in)correct besides the first-order question: is the 
judgement (in)correct?9 
There is more to say about this than I can say here, but it is hard to find this rejection 
of the challenge satisfying.  The initial puzzlement arises because the expressivist maintains 
that normative judgements – presumably unlike other judgements – are desire-like states, 
which play a motivational role, rather than a representational role.  Since such judgements 
 
can use such facts to all the explanatory ends to which the realist can use them.  Indeed, we’ve just seen that 
minimalism can be a hindrance to this end. 
9 Cf. Blackburn (2009: 207): “What I do offer is an account of […] the state of mind of worrying whether one is 
oneself in moral error […]. But if some theorist bent on finding truth-conditions asks me what my account of 
moral error itself is, then I am not very forthcoming.” 
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cannot be (in)correct in virtue of (in)accurately representing an antecedently given normative 
ontology, it’s puzzling how they can be (in)correct at all.  Strategy (3) tries to sidestep the 
worry by saying that the question of what makes it the case that a certain judgement is correct, 
like (A1), is in fact equivalent to a first-order question, like (A2), which is to be answered by 
engaging in first-order normative inquiry.  Now, that might be of comfort if we were already 
satisfied that first-order normative inquiry is the type of thing that can issue in correct and 
incorrect judgements.  But that is precisely what we were puzzled about.  So it is strange to 
conclude that this somehow shows that our initial puzzlement was ill-founded.  On the 
contrary, what follows from the claim that (A1) is equivalent to (A2) is that any answer to the 
question will express a desire-like state, rather than a representational state.  But that is just 
another instance of the claim that gave rise to the initial puzzlement!  Rather than dissolving 
the worry, then, strategy (3) just seems to bring us around in a tight circle.  I for one feel none-
the-wiser for it – just a bit dizzier. 
However, even those committed to strategy (3) should be interested in my 
development of strategy (1), for at least four reasons.  First, strategy (3) seems to rely on 
deflationism, which is independently contentious.  It’d be better if the expressivist didn’t have 
to give away this hostage to fortune.  Second, strategy (3) also runs into a version of the 
Fallibility Challenge.  It is incoherent for me to think de re of any judgement I agree with that 
it is mistaken, or of any judgement that I don’t agree with that it is correct.  But it’s coherent 
to think that a judgement I agree with might be mistaken.10  So we can ask: what it is to think 
that I might be mistaken?  One can understand the Instability Proposal, as Blackburn (2009) 
does, as an answer to this sideways-on question, rather than an instance of strategy (1).11 
Third, as will become clear, it’s difficult to see how the expressivist can avoid 
commitment to the substantive theory of normative (in)correctness developed below, given 
how she conceives of normative inquiry.  Finally, even if some expressivists are happy to 
avoid meeting the Correctness Challenge head-on, critics and undecided neutrals may well 
count this as a mark against them.  It is therefore dialectically advantageous if we can show 
 
10 We’re in preface paradox territory, but it seems I can also coherently think that some of my normative 
judgements are mistaken, if I remain agnostic about which ones. 
11 This way of understanding the Instability Proposal comes with its own difficulties, however – see Beddor 
(2020: 2-3) on the “Semantic Plausibility” difficulty (cf. Schroeder 2013: 416).  By developing the Instability 
Proposal as a part of strategy (1), I remain neutral on the answer to the “sideways-on” question.  My proposal 
can, for instance, be combined with Beddor’s quite different answer. 
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2. NORMATIVE CORRECTNESS FOR EXPRESSIVISTS 
 
So, our goal is to answer the Correctness Challenge by constructing a non-
representational theory of normative (in)correctness that leaves sufficient room for my own 
normative fallibility.  The primary inspiration for the account will be Blackburn’s Instability 
Proposal.  The following passage, ubiquitous in the relevant literature,12 summarises the 
central idea: 
 
“How can I make sense of fears of my own fallibility?  Well, there are a number of things I 
admire: for instance, information, sensitivity, maturity, imagination, coherence.  I know that 
other people show defects in these respects, and that these defects lead to bad opinions.  But 
can I exempt myself from the same possibility?  Of course not (that would be unpardonably 
smug).  So I can think that perhaps some of my opinions are due to defects of information, 
sensitivity, maturity, imagination, and coherence.  If I really set out to investigate whether this 
is true, I stand on one part of the (Neurath) boat and inspect the other parts.” (Blackburn 1998: 
318)  
 
My strategy is as follows.  I extract from Blackburn a conception of the nature of 
normative inquiry (§2.1).  Building on this, I explore, in the abstract, what could happen to a 
particular normative judgement as one successfully engages in normative inquiry (§2.2).  I 
then consider the theoretical significance of this abstract exploration (§2.3).  This enables us to 
see our way clear to a theory of normative (in)correctness that vindicates normative inquiry 




12 It’s surprising that the literature is so focused on this short passage, which crops up in passing in the 
appendix to a book.  The Instability Proposal has been a part of Blackburn’s view for half a century (e.g. 
Blackburn 1971: 122-123) and has been developed at greater length elsewhere (e.g. Blackburn 1984: 198-202).  
Precursors are found in e.g. Peirce (1878) and Putnam (1981). 
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2.1 Normative Inquiry for Expressivists 
 
In addition to first-order normative judgements, agents make higher-order normative 
judgements.  Higher-order norms are “norms [that] govern the acceptance of other norms.” 
(Gibbard 1990: 198)13  For the expressivist, the formation and maintenance of your normative 
outlook is guided by your acceptance of higher-order norms.  For instance, Blackburn thinks 
that a normative outlook that is more informed, sensitive, imaginative, mature, and/or 
coherent than another is to that extent better; that we ought to have normative outlooks that 
are more informed, sensitive, imaginative, mature, coherent.  In engaging in normative 
inquiry, then, Blackburn will seek to become more informed, sensitive, imaginative, mature, 
and coherent. 
Using higher-order normative judgements, we can make sense of the idea that one 
normative outlook x is better than another y by the lights of a third z; where this is so iff it 
follows from z’s higher-order normative judgements and the non-normative facts that x is 
better than y.  For instance, if your opinions on animal ethics are, in fact, more informed, 
sensitive, imaginative, mature, and coherent than mine,14 then your normative outlook is 
better than mine by Blackburn’s lights.  We’ll symbolise this thus: 
 
 x >z y. 
 
In engaging in normative inquiry, I’m trying to make my normative outlook better by 
my own lights.  I successfully engage in normative inquiry if I succeed in doing so. 
 
13 While I follow Blackburn in using higher-order norms to make sense of normative fallibility in particular, the 
overall picture owes more to Gibbard’s development of the expressivist project, which makes substantial use 
of higher-order norms – see especially Gibbard (1990: chs.8-13). 
14 I implicitly assume that these facts are non-normative, which may be controversial.  “Sensitive”, 
“imaginative”, and “mature” in particular are plausible examples of thick normative predicates, and it is 
controversial whether thick predicates are evaluative as part of their semantic content, or convey evaluative 
content by some pragmatic mechanism (Väyrynen 2019).  The former is in tension with taking facts about the 
sensitivity, imaginativeness, maturity of normative outlooks for granted in this context; the latter – which 
Blackburn (1992; 2013) himself favours – is not.  Since the expressivist is unlikely to be able to use higher-order 
normative judgements to account for normative inquiry unless they are generally concerned with non-
normative features, for present purposes I work with the substantive but plausible assumption that this is so, 
using Blackburn’s examples as stand-ins for these non-normative features. 
  Page 10 of 34 
 
Higher-order normative judgements are themselves normative judgements, so my 
acceptance of a higher-order norm will itself be governed by higher-order norms.15  This raises 
a question about the structure of our higher-order normative judgements.  They could be 
hierarchically structured: first-order judgements are governed by second-order judgements; 
second-order by third-order; and so on.16  To avoid an infinite regress, we’d need highest-
order normative judgements, whose acceptance is not governed by other norms.  I find this 
unattractive.17  On my preferred view, we instead embrace a “Neurath’s Boat”-style 
epistemology: one’s acceptance of any particular higher-order norm is itself governed by one’s 
acceptance of other higher-order norms.18 
So, my higher-order normative judgements may change as I successfully engage in 
normative inquiry.  Nonetheless, at any stage I will be trying to make my normative outlook 
better by the lights of the higher-order normative judgements that I endorse at that time. 
We can capture this idea by recursively defining a notion of accessibility: a normative 
outlook x is accessible from another y (‘x > y’) iff either x is better than y by y’s lights, or there is 
some normative outlook z, such that x is accessible from z, and z is better than y by y’s lights. 
 
Accessibility 
x > y ≝ x >y y ∨ ∃z (x > z & z >y y). 
 
Intuitively, x is accessible from y if we can get from y to x via a series of incremental 
changes, each of which is an improvement by the lights of the outlook being changed.  Call 
this process self-improvement.  The recursivity of the definition guarantees that accessibility is 
transitive. 
This allows us to define, for any normative outlook x, its improvement* set, X, which is 
the set of normative outlooks accessible from x, plus x itself.  (Including x is just a formal 
choice.)  Intuitively, your improvement* set consists of every possible normative outlook you 
 
15 This is why I focus on normative judgements in general, rather than moral judgements in particular. 
16 Gibbard (1990: 170ff) sometimes talks this way, but is officially neutral (1990: 176, fn.3). 
17 For instance, it would be unclear how to make sense of the possibility that a highest-order normative 
judgement is mistaken.  Perhaps, however, one could argue on precisely this basis that our highest-order 
normative judgements are “inescapable”; and leverage this into a transcendental argument in their favour.  
This is a theme in Gibbard (1990: 176-179). 
18 This is, I think, Blackburn’s (2009: 206) view. 
  Page 11 of 34 
 
could end up with by going through the process of self-improvement; that is, by successfully 
engaging in normative inquiry, as the expressivist conceives of it.19 
 
2.2 Outcomes of Self-Improvement 
 
Given the above, we can reflect on what may happen to any particular judgement as 
one successfully engages in normative inquiry.  It will be useful in what follows to have some 
light formalism to express ideas precisely.  To that end, we’ll put square-brackets around a 
sentence to represent the judgement expressed by that sentence: “[p]” represents the judgement 
that p.  Continuing to use lower-case letters “x”, “y”, and “z” as variables ranging over 
normative outlooks, “[p] ∈ x” means x thinks that p, and “[p] ∉ x” means x does not think that p.  
Given that one can suspend judgement, not thinking that p does not entail thinking that not-
p; so “[p] ∉ x” should not be confused with “[¬p] ∈ x”.  For the same reason, we’ll use “not-
[p]” to represent the absence of the judgement that p; where “[¬p]” represents the judgement that 
¬p. 
 
2.2.1 Stable-Points and Unstable-Points 
 
Let’s start by defining the notion of a stable-point for [p]: 
 
 x is a stable-point for [p] ≝ [p] ∈ x & ∀y (y > x → [p] ∈ y). 
 
That is, x thinks that p, and so does every normative outlook in x’s improvement* set.  
So, no matter how much x self-improves, she’ll never stop thinking that p.  Likewise: 
 
 x is a stable-point for not-[p] ≝ [p] ∉ x & ∀y (y > x → [p] ∉ y). 
 
 
19 The asterisk highlights that your improvement* set consists of those outlooks accessible to you through 
what you take (at each stage) to be improving changes; rather than what in fact are improving changes. 
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That is, x does not think that p, and nor does any normative outlook in x’s 
improvement* set.  So, no matter how much x self-improves, she’ll never come to think that 
p.  Finally: 
 
 x is an unstable-point for [p] ≝ ∀y ((y = x ∨ y > x) → 
(([p] ∈ y → ∃z (z > y & [p] ∉ z)) & ([p] ∉ y → ∃z (z > y & [p] ∈ z)))). 
 
That is, for every normative outlook y in x’s improvement* set: if y thinks that p, then 
there is an outlook accessible from y that does not think that p; and if y does not think that p, 
then there is an outlook accessible from y that does.  So, no matter how much x self-improves, 
there is a further self-improvement that will lead her to change her mind. 
These properties are mutually exclusive.  And they are improvement*-stable, in the 
following sense: if a normative outlook x instantiates one of these properties, every outlook in 
x’s improvement* set instantiates the same property. 
While the properties are not jointly exhaustive – it is possible for a normative outlook 
to be neither a stable-point for [p] nor a stable-point for not-[p] without thereby being an 
unstable-point for [p] – they are improvement*-exhaustive, in the following sense.  For any 
normative outlook x and any normative judgement [p], x is not an unstable-point for [p] iff 
there is either a stable-point for [p] or a stable-point for not-[p] in x’s improvement* set.  In 
other words, if x is not an unstable-point for [p], while that does not entail that x itself is a 
stable-point either for [p] or for not-[p], it does entail that there is such a stable-point accessible 
from x.20  So, any improvement* set whatsoever must contain either a stable-point for [p] or a 
stable-point for not-[p], or else will consist solely of unstable-points for [p]. 
The properties are not, however, improvement*-exclusive: there is no contradiction in 
supposing that there is a stable-point for [p], a, a stable-point for not-[p], b, and an unstable-
point for [p], c, accessible from the same normative outlook, x.  The improvement* sets of a, b, 
 
20 Proof.  For x to be an unstable-point for [p], two conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient.  
(1) For every y accessible from x that thinks that p, there is some z accessible from y that does not think that p.  
This rules out that any y accessible from x is a stable-point for [p].  (2) For every y accessible from x that does 
not think that p, there is some z accessible from y that does think that p.  This rules out that any y accessible 
from x is a stable-point for not-[p].  So, x is an unstable-point for [p] iff there is no stable-point for [p] 
accessible from x, and no stable-point for not-[p] accessible from x. 
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and c must be (i) disjoint and (ii) subsets of x’s improvement* set.  But there is no contradiction 
in supposing that a set contains disjoint sets as proper subsets. 
So, to summarise, for any normative outlook x and normative judgement [p], the 
following options are jointly exhaustive, but not mutually exclusive: 
 
(A) There is a stable-point for [p] in x’s improvement* set. 
(B) There is a stable-point for not-[p] in x’s improvement* set. 
(C) There is an unstable-point for [p] in x’s improvement* set. 
 
Moving forward, I’ll suppress possibility (C).  This is just to simplify presentation.  
Improvement* sets that contain unstable-points are special cases of possibilities I discuss 




Setting aside (C), for any normative outlook x and normative judgement [p], either 
there is a stable-point for [p] in x’s improvement* set, or a stable-point for not-[p], or both. 
What goes for [p] goes for the contradictory judgement [¬p].  So, looking at both a 
judgement [p] (the columns) and its contradictory judgement [¬p] (the rows), we get nine 
possibilities, represented by the cells in Table 1. 
 
 Stable point for…? 
[p] Not-[p] [p] Not-[p] [p] Not-[p] 




[¬p] Yes   Disfavours: [p]. 
Not-[¬p] Yes 
[¬p] Yes   Favours: [¬p]. 
Disfavours: [p].  Not-[¬p] No 
[¬p] No Disfavours: [¬p].  Favours: [p]. 
Disfavours: [¬p].  





[4] [5] [6] 
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Three of these cells are greyed out.  This comes from our second (and final) simplifying 
assumption: that for any normative judgement [p] and its contradictory [¬p], there is no 
outlook that is a stable-point for both [p] and [¬p].  This is also just to simplify presentation – 
enthusiasts are once more directed to fn.46. 
(To see this, take the left cell on the centre row, and suppose our improvement* set is 
X.  By assumption, there is a stable-point for [p] in X – call it y, and its improvement* set, Y.  
Since accessibility is transitive, Y is a subset of X.  Given that there is no unstable-point for 
[¬p] in Y, there is either a stable-point for [¬p] or one for not-[¬p] in Y.  By assumption, 
however, there is no stable-point for not-[¬p] in X, and so a fortiori none in Y.  So, there must 
be a stable-point for [¬p] in Y – call it, z.  But since z is accessible from y and y is a stable-point 
for [p], it follows that z is a stable-point for [p] and [¬p].  Similar reasoning runs for the centre 
cell on the top row and the centre cell of the centre row.  So, if no pair of contradictory 
judgements has such a stable-point, then these three possibilities are ruled out.) 
We’re left with six possibilities, represented by the other cells in the table.  It’s helpful 
to represent these possibilities diagrammatically (Figure 1).  Figure 1 is interpreted as follows.  
The bottom circle represents a normative outlook and the bold, external box its improvement* 
set.  The arrows represent the accessibility relation, and the bold circles the kinds of stable-
point accessible from that normative outlook.  A “p” in the bold circle means it’s a stable-point 
for [p] and not-[¬p]; a “¬p” means it’s a stable-point for [¬p] and not-[p]; and an empty bold 
circle is a stable-point for not-[p] and not-[¬p].  The internal boxes represent the disjoint 
improvement* sets of the stable-points represented. 
 
 
[1]: No favouritism. 
 
[2]: Disfavours [p]. 
p ¬p ¬p p ¬p 
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[3]: Favours [¬p], Disfavours [p]. 
 
[4]: Disfavours [¬p]. 
 
[5]: Favours [p], Disfavours [¬p]. 
 
[6]: Disfavours [p], [¬p]. 
Figure 1. 
 
Now, certain improvement* sets seem to “favour” or “disfavour” different normative 
judgements, depending on what kinds of stable-point one can reach via self-improvement.  
Consider [5].  Self-improvement can only lead you to a stable-point for [p]; it cannot lead you 
to a stable-point for not-[p].  In this sense, it favours [p].  By contrast, self-improvement can 
only lead you to a stable-point for not-[¬p]; it cannot lead you to a stable-point for [¬p].  In this 
sense, it disfavours [¬p]. 
Contrast this with, say, [2].  Self-improvement can only lead you to a stable-point for 
not-[p], it cannot lead you to a stable-point for [p].  So, it disfavours [p].  However, self-
improvement can either lead you to a stable-point for [¬p], or to a stable-point for not-[¬p].  So 
it neither favours nor disfavours [¬p]. 
p ¬p 
p 
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We can render this idea precise by saying that a set of normative outlooks X favours 
[p] iff, for every outlook x in X, there is a stable-point for [p], y, that is either accessible from 
or identical to x: 
 
A set of normative outlooks X favours [p] ≝ 
∀x (x ∈ X → ∃y ((y > x ∨ y = x) & ∀z ((z > y ∨ z = y) → [p] ∈ z))). 
 
And X disfavours [p] iff, for every outlook x in X, there is a stable-point for not-[p], y, 
that is either accessible from or identical to x: 
 
A set of normative outlooks X disfavours [p] ≝ 
∀x (x ∈ X → ∃y ((y > x ∨ y = x) & ∀z ((z > y ∨ z = y) → [p] ∉ z))). 
 
Intuitively, a set of outlooks (dis)favours a normative judgement [p] iff every outlook 
in that set either is a stable-point for (not-)[p], or could reach a stable-point for (not-)[p] via 
self-improvement. 
 
2.3 The Significance of Favouritism 
 
Our discussion thus far has been abstract.  We’re now in a position to consider its 
philosophical significance. 
 
2.3.1 Undermining Normative Inquiry 
 
For the expressivist, to engage in normative inquiry is to try to self-improve.  But it 
seems, at first blush, that one’s reliance on self-improvement as a means for answering 
normative questions would be undermined if your improvement* set exemplified some of the 
structures laid out above. 
Consider [1]: self-improvement can lead you to a stable-point for [p], but can also lead 
you to a stable-point for [¬p].  If this were so, then engaging in normative inquiry would seem 
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pointless, as far as coming to a decision on this matter is concerned.21  The process could as 
much lead to one verdict as another.  So why bother?  You might as well flip a coin. 
Or consider [6]: self-improvement cannot lead you to either a stable-point for [p], or a 
stable-point for [¬p].  As we put it above, self-improvement disfavours making a judgement 
one way or the other.22  But the whole point of engaging in normative inquiry is to try and 




There are, however, cases in which we arguably should not expect normative inquiry 
to issue in a verdict one way or the other: cases of indeterminate normativity. 
For example, to get your attention, it’s clearly morally permissible, in the normal run 
of things, to tap your shoulder.  It’s clearly morally impermissible to punch your shoulder.  
The difference between a tap and a punch is, let’s suppose, a matter of force.  But exactly how 
much force is too much?  Trying to find a precise cut-off here is like trying to find a precise 
cut-off between red and orange.  Moral permissibility is vague: tapping is clearly permissible, 
punching clearly impermissible, but between the two there is a “zone of indeterminacy”, a set 
of borderline cases, which are neither clearly permissible nor clearly impermissible.23 
Suppose that φ-ing is one such borderline case.  What is distinctive of the uncertainty 
engendered by indeterminacy is precisely that it does not seem resolvable, even in principle, 
through further inquiry.  When faced with a borderline reddy-orangey colour swatch, no 
further information could help you figure out whether it is red or orange.  You already have 
all the relevant information.  The information just doesn’t warrant a verdict one way or the 
other.  Likewise, our uncertainty as to whether φ-ing is permissible does not feel like it is 
resolvable through further inquiry. 
 
21 I hedge because self-improvement might have other benefits – e.g., your verdict might cohere nicely with 
your other views.  Nonetheless, as far as this normative matter is concerned, flipping a coin seems as good as 
engaging in normative inquiry. 
22 Similar reasoning would run if there is an unstable-point for [p] accessible from your normative outlook, the 
possibility suppressed by our first simplifying assumption.  This is a special case of [1], where neither [p] nor 
[¬p] is favoured or disfavoured by your improvement* set. 
23 If this example doesn’t convince you, there are others – as Williams (2017) stresses, not all instances of 
indeterminate normativity result from vagueness, and global scepticism is radical and unattractive. 
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So, if a normative matter is indeterminate, arguably we should not expect normative 
inquiry to issue in a verdict one way or the other.  On the contrary, it’s plausible that 
normative inquiry should disfavour forming an opinion one way or the other (as in [6]); or at 
least shouldn’t favour either verdict (as in [1]).24 
 
2.3.3 Higher-Order Indeterminacy 
 
Between tapping and punching, we’ve said, is a zone of indeterminacy: cases that are 
neither clearly permissible, nor clearly impermissible.  But where, exactly, does this zone of 
indeterminacy begin?  Finding a precise cut-off here – between the cases that are clearly 
permissible and those that are not clearly permissible – is no easier than finding the original 
cut-off.  This creates a second-order zone of indeterminacy, between the clearly permissible and 
the not clearly permissible. 
Suppose that ψ-ing falls into this second-order zone: (i) ψ-ing is not clearly clearly 
permissible, and (ii) ψ-ing is not clearly not clearly permissible.  Given this, it’s plausible that 
normative inquiry should neither favour nor disfavour the judgement [ψ-ing is permissible]. 
However, ψ-ing is clearly not clearly impermissible.  If ψ-ing were clearly 
impermissible, then ψ-ing would clearly not be clearly permissible, contradicting (ii).  So 
normative inquiry should disfavour [ψ-ing is not permissible]. 
This is exactly the structure found in [4].  An improvement* set with this structure 
disfavours [ψ-ing is not permissible] without favouring or disfavouring [ψ-ing is permissible]. 
Analogous reasoning runs at the other end of the zone of first-order indeterminacy, 
concerning the cut-off between what is clearly impermissible and what is not clearly 
impermissible.  If χ-ing falls into this zone of second-order indeterminacy, then arguably 
normative inquiry should neither favour nor disfavour [χ-ing is not permissible], while 




24 [1] and [6] reflect different answers to the question of what attitude you ought to take towards normative p 
when the matter is indeterminate: [6] that you should neither believe that p nor believe that not-p (but, say, 
have middling credence or suspend judgement); [1] that it is permissible to either believe p or believe not-p 
(cf. Williams 2014). 
25 There are yet higher orders of indeterminacy, but these create no relevant complications. 
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2.3.4 Determinacy and Favouritism 
 
So, one’s reliance on self-improvement as a means for answering normative questions 
is compatible with your improvement* set having structure [1], [2], [4], or [6] if the matter is 
indeterminate, at some order of indeterminacy.  But if there is a determinate fact of the matter, 
it would be undermined.  Since engaging in normative inquiry typically presupposes that 
there is determinate fact of the matter, you are implicitly relying on your improvement* set 
having structure [3] or [5]; that is, either favouring [p], or favouring [¬p]. 
Moreover, one’s reliance on self-improvement would be undermined if your 
improvement* set favoured [p] when it is (determinately) not the case that p; or if your 
improvement* set favoured [¬p] when it is (determinately) the case that p.  As we’ll discuss 
more below, this amounts to a kind of sceptical scenario, where successful engagement in 
normative inquiry leads you to the determinately wrong answer. 
 
2.4 A Theory of Normative (In)Correctness 
 
Drawing on the above, we can offer a non-representational theory of normative 
(in)correctness that vindicates the nature of normative inquiry as the expressivist conceives of 
it, and should therefore be attractive to the expressivist.  For the time being, I’ll put an 
implausible emphasis on my own normative outlook w and improvement* set W.  I’ll amend 
this later in the light of the Smugness Objection.  But the following captures the structure of 
the proposal: 
 
Normative (In)Correctness (W-centric) 
It is determinately correct to believe that p iff W favours [p]. 
It is determinately incorrect to believe that p iff W favours [¬p]. 
 
Two related observations.  First, this proposal has important consequences for the 
extension of indeterminate normativity.  From: 
 
It is determinately correct to believe that p iff it is determinately the case that p, 





It is indeterminate whether p iff it is not determinately the case that p and it is not 




It is indeterminate whether p iff it is not determinately correct to believe that p and not 
determinately correct to believe that not-p. 
 
So from Normative (In)Correctness (W-centric), it follows: 
 
It is indeterminate whether p iff W does not favour [p] and W does not favour [¬p].26,27 
 
Second, this is strictly speaking a theory of determinate normative (in)correctness.  If 
we drop the reference to determinacy, we get: if it is indeterminate whether p, then it is 
incorrect to believe that p.  That’s not implausible, but it is a substantive commitment (see 
fn.24) that we don’t need.  Instead, we’re only committed to: if it is indeterminate whether p, 




We’ve developed a non-representational theory of normative (in)correctness that 
should be attractive to the expressivist.  However, the proposal faces two interrelated 
 
26 In work-in-progress, I explore this expressivist-friendly approach to indeterminate normativity in much more 
detail, e.g. showing how it can be fleshed out to accord with different logics of indeterminacy (gappy, glutty, 
many-valued, classical-supervaluational), and different accounts of indeterminacy’s “cognitive role” (e.g. what 
attitude one ought to take towards indeterminate p).  Such details can be set aside here. 
27 Our second simplifying assumption ruled out improvement* sets that favour [p] without disfavouring [¬p] 
and vice versa, including those that favour both [p] and [¬p].  In the latter case, the present theory predicts 
that it is correct to believe that p and correct to believe that ¬p (akin to a normative dialetheia).  I think this is 
just the right result in this far-fetched case; but if you want to rule it out, you can supplement the account of 
correctness with “…and W does not favour [¬p].”  This entails that “p” is indeterminate. 
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objections regarding normative fallibility: the Limited Fallibility Objection and the Smugness 
Objection.  I’ll discuss these in turn, before responding to a third objection that arises from the 
response to the second. 
 
3.1 The Limited Fallibility Objection 
 
Objection.  Our non-representational theory of normative (in)correctness enables me to 
make sense of my own normative fallibility.  While I think that eating meat is wrong, I might 
be mistaken, since my improvement* set might favour [eating meat is not wrong].  This is, in 
effect, a sophisticated version of the Instability Proposal.  However, this gives me no way of 
making sense of the possibility that my improvement* set favours a mistaken normative 
judgement.  However unlikely I take this to be, the suggestion looks coherent.  So we ought to 
be able to make sense of it.  But it looks like we have no way of doing so.  This is the Limited 
Fallibility Objection.28 
Response.  Expressivism is a rival to metanormative views like non-naturalist and 
naturalist realism, constructivism, and error theory.  Now, suppose (i) that we can make sense 
of the possibility that some other metanormative view is correct, and (ii) that at least one such 
view does not imply that it is correct to believe that p iff my improvement* set favours [p].  If, 
for instance, non-naturalist realism is true, then there is a sui generis realm of normative facts, 
and there is no obvious a priori guarantee that the judgements favoured by my improvement* 
set will line-up with them.  It follows that, if expressivism is not true, then it may be incorrect 
to believe that p, even if my improvement* set favours [p].  The expressivist, we’re supposing, 
denies the consequent of this conditional; but she can nonetheless affirm the conditional itself, 
since she also denies its antecedent.  So the expressivist can make sense of the possibility that 
not-p, even if her improvement* set favours [p] – she does so conditional on the assumption 
that some other metanormative view than her own is correct.29 
(Assumptions (i) and (ii) are eminently plausible.  And if either fails, this would make 
the Limited Fallibility Objection everyone’s problem: either because, contra (i), there are no rival 
metanormative views; or because, contra (ii), every such rival implies that it is correct to 
 
28 Cf. Blackburn (2009: 203-204). 
29 See Horgan & Timmons (2015: 205-206) for a related response. 
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believe that p iff my improvement* set favours [p].  Indeed, it is enough that it is coherent to 
think that there could be a rival metanormative view that doesn’t have this consequence, 
whether or not there are any.) 
So the objection is only pressing if we suppose that I ought to be able to make sense of 
the possibility that my improvement* set favours a mistaken normative judgement even on the 
assumption that expressivism is true.  But it’s hard to see why the expressivist should 
acknowledge this as a legitimate constraint.  The envisaged possibility is a sceptical scenario, 
where even my best efforts to uncover the normative truth will lead me astray.  Taking this 
possibility seriously would therefore undermine ordinary normative inquiry.  Given that the 
expressivist aims to vindicate everyday normative practice, it is other things equal a good-
making feature of her theory if it rules out such sceptical possibilities.30 
 
3.2 The Smugness Objection 
 
3.2.1 The Objection 
 
The W-centric account of normative (in)correctness rules out the possibility that my 
improvement* set favours a determinately incorrect normative judgement.  It thus rules out 
that I’m in a certain kind of sceptical scenario.  But it doesn’t rule out that you are in such a 
scenario.  Suppose that my improvement* set favours [¬p], but yours favours [p].  Following 
the literature, we’ll say that we fundamentally disagree.  (Note that “fundamental 
disagreement” so understood is a term of art; it may not track its use in other contexts.)  It 
follows from the W-centric account that your improvement* set favours a determinately 
incorrect normative judgement.  In this sense, you are vulnerable to a kind of error to which I 
am immune.  But taking my normative outlook to be special just because it is mine would surely 
be arbitrary and self-aggrandising.  This is the Smugness Objection.31 
Extant attempts to meet the Smugness Objection in the literature are inadequate.32 
 
30 A similar point is made by Blackburn (1996) and Bex-Priestley (2018: 1062). 
31 Egan (2007: 215-217).  We can see this as a way of pressing the Limited Fallibility Objection: unless I make 
more room for my own fallibility, I’ll be guilty of smugness. 
32 The literature typically focuses on the special case of what I’m calling fundamental disagreement, where my 
current outlook is a stable-point for [p], and yours a stable-point for [¬p].  It also typically focuses on moral 
disagreement.  These details don’t impact the discussion. 
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Lenman (2014) dramatizes the possibility of fundamental moral disagreement by 
imagining “The Others”, a community with whom we fundamentally disagree: “The Others 
live on a distant planet in a remote galaxy and, while they are recognizably rational creatures, 
while indeed they are really rather clever, their moral beliefs are, by our lights, immensely 
alien and strange and perhaps rather horrible.” (2014: 242-243)  Lenman says that he doesn’t 
want “smugly to affirm that they are wrong and [he is] right” because he doesn’t “see the 
point of saying anything of the sort.” (2014: 243)  His claim seems to be that the concept of 
being right or wrong about a moral matter only applies to “those with whom I seek to live in 
moral community […] a local problem to which the distant and alien Others have no 
relevance.” (ibid.) 
I find this hard to understand.  There’s a danger of being misled by the dramatization.  
Perhaps we can shrug off The Others as “don’t cares” as long as they stay isolated in their 
distant galaxy.  But that is utterly contingent – what if they warp to Earth?  If we are forced to 
live in a moral community with them, Lenman’s response cannot get a grip.  And even while 
they are distant, insofar as we disagree with The Others’ moral judgements, aren’t we 
(relativism aside)33 committed to thinking that at least one of us must be in the wrong?  And 
even if we’re happy shrugging off The Others, what to say about fundamental moral 
disagreement here on Earth?34 
Horgan & Timmons (2015: 202-203) observe that it is often thought to be rationally 
permissible to stick with your own judgement when disagreeing with a peer.  They take this 
to imply that it is rationally permissible – and hence not “unpardonably smug” – to privilege 
your own judgement in cases of fundamental disagreement.  But this fails to speak to the 
worry.  Even if it is rationally permissible to retain my judgement when I fundamentally 
disagree with a peer, I should still allow that it could be the case that she is right and I am 
wrong.  The Smugness Objection targets my inability to do so.  Nothing Horgan & Timmons 
(2015: 202-204) say in their response speaks to this worry.35 
 
33 Lenman (2014: 243) and Bex-Preistley (2018: 1060) hint at a relativistic response.  Relativism is, I think, a live 
option; but to rein in discussion I’ll continue implicitly working in an absolutist framework.  This is dialectically 
permissible: assuming absolutism makes the Smugness Objection more pressing. 
34 Lenman (2014: 242) is optimistic that fundamental moral disagreement on Earth is rare.  I’m sympathetic.  
Nonetheless, it’s possible; so we need to address it. 
35 Ironically, the epistemological principle Horgan & Timmons appeal to makes the Smugness Objection more 
pressing, since it’s likely to make fundamental moral disagreement more common.  Consider the rival 
“conciliationist” view: when disagreeing with a peer, you ought to suspend judgement.  So, if x and y are peers 
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Ridge (2015) explains how to make sense of the possibility that one of my judgements 
is stable – in the sense that it would survive arbitrary self-improvement – and yet still could be 
mistaken.  It seems coherent to think this pen would fall, if dropped, but also that it could fail 
to fall.  Ridge suggests this is because the semantics of “would” is only sensitive to nearby 
possible worlds, while “could” is sensitive to all epistemically possible worlds.  Even if the 
pen falls in all nearby worlds, as long as I am not certain it will fall, there is an epistemically 
possible world in which it does not fall.  Similarly, Ridge argues, it is coherent to think that 
my judgement [p] would survive arbitrary self-improvement, but also that it could fail to do 
so.36  If so, it is coherent to think that my judgement is stable, and yet could be mistaken. 
Now, if it could be the case that one of my judgements is both stable and mistaken, 
then my stable judgements are not immune from error, meaning there is no asymmetry 
between you and me on this front.  However, Ridge has not explained why it is coherent to 
think that it could be that my judgement is both stable and mistaken – a thought of the form ‘could(p 
& q)’.  He has explained why it is coherent to think that my judgement is stable and yet could be 
mistaken – a thought of the form ‘p & could(q)’.  The coherence of the former thought does not 
follow from the coherence of the latter.  It makes sense to think that this pen would fall, but 
could fail to fall, because there is a distant world in which it does not fall; but it doesn’t make 
sense to think that this pen could both fall and not fall – that requires a world in which it both 
does and doesn’t fall.  Likewise, for Ridge it makes sense to think that my judgement would 
survive arbitrary self-improvement, but could be mistaken, because there is a distant world 
in which it doesn’t survive self-improvement; but then it doesn’t make sense to think my judgement 
could be both stable and mistaken – that requires a world in which it both does and doesn’t 
survive self-improvement.  So I cannot make sense of the idea that my judgement could be 
both stable and mistaken.37  But I can make sense of the idea that one of your judgements could 
be both stable and mistaken.  The asymmetry stands. 
 
that disagree, then by the lights of conciliationism, each could improve by suspending judgement.  So for 
improvement* sets that favour conciliationism, there is pressure towards lack of disagreement on moral 
issues.  But if an improvement* set does not favour conciliationism, this source of pressure disappears. 
36 Assuming I am not certain that it is stable.  What if I am certain?  Ridge argues that such certainty is 
unreasonable, so I would already be guilty of an epistemic vice: “the fault here lies with the agent and not with 
the expressivist account of her judgement.” (2015: 18)  Perhaps so, but expressivism still seems to entail that I 
am guilty of a further epistemic vice – see Bex-Priestley (2018: 1059). 
37 Bex-Priestley (2018: 1059-1060) develops a different argument to the same conclusion. 
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Finally, Bex-Priestley (2018) argues that the expressivist should be willing to embrace 
the “smugness”, arguing that doing so is not revisionary of ordinary moral thought and talk, 
and that it amounts to a kind of transcendental argument against radical moral scepticism. 
Bex-Priestly is, I think, half-right.  Any normative outlook x is either (i) better than 
mine, by my own lights; (ii) worse than mine, by my own lights; or (iii) no better or worse 
than mine, by my own lights.  If (i), then x is in my improvement* set, and the question of 
smugness does not arise.  But what about (ii)?  Suppose that your outlook is less informed, 
less sensitive, less imaginative, less mature, less coherent, and consequently worse than mine, 
by my lights.  I therefore have principled grounds for thinking that you might be vulnerable to 
a kind of error to which I am immune.  What privileges my normative outlook over yours is 
not the arbitrary feature that it’s mine.  It’s that it is more informed, more sensitive, more 
imaginative, more mature, more coherent.  These are, by my lights, exactly the kinds of 
features that put one in a better epistemic position.  So there would be nothing arbitrary or 
smug about thinking on these grounds that there could be an asymmetry between us.  Of course, 
in saying this I am expressing my own (higher-order) normative views.  But there’s nothing 
smug about that. 
But now suppose your outlook is no better or worse than mine, by my lights.  Perhaps 
our outlooks are equally good,38 or perhaps my higher-order normative judgements render 
no verdict on the matter.  (For instance, if I am better informed, but you are more coherent, 
and my higher-order norms don’t include any precise way of trading these off.)  I therefore 
have no non-arbitrary grounds for thinking that you might be vulnerable to a kind of error to 
which I am immune.  By my own lights, there can be other, perfectly reasonable starting points 
for normative inquiry besides my own.  Contra Bex-Priestley, we cannot embrace the 
asymmetry across the board. 
 
3.2.2 The Response 
 
Call my improvement* set W and your improvement* set V.  The asymmetry arises 
because the W-centric account of normative (in)correctness appeals to the judgements 
favoured by W, not V; and our improvement* sets may favour different judgements.  A V-
 
38 Or stand in some further comparability relation, if such exists – e.g. Chang’s (2002) being on a par. 
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centric account would be just as bad.  To eliminate the asymmetry, we need to take the stable-
points accessible from your normative outlook just as seriously as the stable-points accessible 
from mine. 
It’s straightforward to do so.  Take the union of our improvement* sets, {W∪V}, and 
replace all occurrences of W in our account of normative (in)correctness with {W∪V}: 
 
Normative (In)Correctness (W-and-V-centric) 
It is determinately correct to believe that p iff {W∪V} favours [p]. 
It is determinately incorrect to believe that p iff {W∪V} favours [¬p]. 
 
Any asymmetry between us is eliminated.  {W∪V} favours [p] iff W favours [p] and V 
favours [p].  So it is determinately correct to believe that p iff [p] is favoured by both our 
improvement* sets; and it is determinately incorrect to believe that p iff [¬p] is favoured by 
both our improvement* sets.  In any other eventuality, including cases of fundamental normative 
disagreement, it is neither determinately correct nor determinately incorrect to believe that p.  
So, your improvement* set can either favour, disfavour, or neither favour nor disfavour a 
normative judgement that is not determinately correct; and so can mine.  Neither of us is 
advantaged or disadvantaged.  Here, then, is the strategy for answering the Smugness 
Objection: generalise this smugness-barring move to eliminate the problematic asymmetry 
wherever it arises. 
The difficult question concerns how far we need to extend the generalisation.  Let’s 
say that a normative outlook x is reasonable only if it is not the case that any judgement 
favoured by x’s improvement* set is determinately incorrect.  Our question, then, is which 
normative outlooks we should consider reasonable. 
Now, I have a substantive view on this matter.  In responding to Bex-Priestley, I 
argued (i) that it would be arbitrary to think that my outlook is reasonable and yours is not if 
yours is no worse than mine by my own lights, but (ii) that I would have principled grounds 
for thinking that your outlook might be unreasonable if it is worse than mine by my lights.  
Since I’m committed to my own outlook being reasonable, it follows that x is reasonable if x 
is no worse than my outlook (by my lights).  So, by extending the smugness-barring move to 
include all those outlooks no worse than mine by my lights, our theory of normative 
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(in)correctness would only imply an asymmetry between those outlooks no worse than mine 
by my lights and those that are worse than mine by my lights.  And this asymmetry, I’ve 
argued, is principled, not arbitrary. 
However, I ought to allow for the possibility that I am currently mistaken about which 
normative outlooks are reasonable.  After all, which normative outlooks I consider reasonable 
is determined by which higher-order norms I endorse.  This suggests that which normative 
outlooks are reasonable is itself a normative question; i.e. that [x is reasonable] is a normative 
judgement.   My own view is that x is reasonable if x is no worse than my outlook (by my 
lights).  But I could be mistaken. 
Let’s say that a normative outlook x is favoured by a set of normative outlooks S (or S-
favoured) iff [x is reasonable] is favoured by S.  For instance, if my judgement that your outlook 
v is reasonable would survive arbitrary self-improvement, then v is favoured by my 
improvement* set W, or W-favoured.  So the W-favoured outlooks are not merely those I 
happen to think are reasonable right now, but those that successful normative inquiry would 
lead me to believe are reasonable.  Plausibly, then, I ought to generalise the smugness-barring 
move to just the W-favoured outlooks.  That is, where W* is the union of the improvement* 
sets of the W-favoured outlooks:39 
 
Normative (In)Correctness (W*-centric) 
It is determinately correct to believe that p iff [p] is favoured by W*. 
It is determinately incorrect to believe that p iff [¬p] is favoured by W*. 
 
This renders the Smugness Objection unstable: the objector must argue that some 
outlook x is reasonable but not W-favoured, or W-favoured but not reasonable.  But any 
compelling argument that x is reasonable is an argument that I ought to accept [x is 
reasonable], and thus an argument that x is W-favoured; and any argument that x is not 
reasonable is an argument that I ought not to accept [x is reasonable], and thus that x is not 
W-favoured. 
 
39 As long as my present normative outlook is W-favoured, the W*-favoured outlooks will be a subset of the 
W-favoured outlooks, and so already in W*. 
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What if there is fundamental disagreement about which outlooks are reasonable?40  In 
such a case, there are three outlooks in play: the two that fundamentally disagree – w and v, 
say – and the outlook whose reasonableness is at issue – call it, a.  Suppose that [a is reasonable] 
is favoured by W, but [a is not reasonable] is favoured by V. 
If v is itself W-favoured, then W and V are both subsets of W*; so, [a is reasonable] is 
neither favoured nor disfavoured by W*.  It follows that it is indeterminate whether a is 
reasonable; so, there is no asymmetry between w and v.  (Indeterminacy about reasonableness 
seems unobjectionable – there is no reason that there should be a sharp cut-off between the 
reasonable and unreasonable normative outlooks.)41 
If v is not W-favoured, then it may be the case that it is determinately correct to believe 
that a is reasonable, even though v’s improvement* set favours [a is not reasonable].  But since 
successful normative inquiry will not lead me to believe that v is reasonable, this is just an 
instance of the principled asymmetry I’ve argued the expressivist should be willing to 
embrace.  So, no distinct problem is posed by fundamental disagreement about which 
outlooks are reasonable. 
 
3.3 The Proliferation Objection 
 
Objection.  If two reasonable outlooks fundamentally disagree, it follows on the 
proposed account that the matter is indeterminate.  This removes any implausible epistemic 
asymmetry between reasonable outlooks.  But we might worry that the proposal hereby 
proliferates indeterminate normativity to an unacceptable extent.  Call this the Proliferation 
Objection. 
It’s hard to press the Proliferation Objection by pointing to a particular case of 
fundamental disagreement and insisting that there must be a determinate fact of the matter 
about that.  While postulating indeterminacy arguably undermines the significance of the 
dispute, the very fact that there is an irresolvable disagreement between reasonable normative 
 
40 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this worry. 
41 a would be W-favoured, but not W*-favoured.  This potential discrepancy is a feature of the account: we can 
use the W*-favoured outlooks to make sense of higher-orders of determinacy: e.g., it is determinately 
determinately correct to believe that p iff [p] is favoured by W** (where W** is the union of the 
improvement* sets of the W*-favoured outlooks); and it is determinately determinately determinately correct 
to believe that p iff [p] is favoured by W***; and so on up the hierarchy. 
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outlooks provides some reason to think the matter indeterminate;42 and by the expressivist’s 
lights, there is no antecedently given normative ontology that could determine the matter one 
way or the other. 
The Proliferation Objection is most pressing if we assume that there is widespread 
fundamental normative disagreement about important topics – such as vegetarianism, 
abortion, euthanasia, the death penalty, torture, trolley cases, and so on.  Widespread 
indeterminacy would undermine vast swathes of ordinary normative discourse.43 
Response.  It is not clear that there is widespread fundamental normative disagreement; 
and if there is, this would already undermine ordinary normative discourse – the 
accompanying proliferation of indeterminacy doesn’t make matters worse. 
To be a stable-point for [p], it is not sufficient that you will not, in fact, change your 
mind; nor even that you could continue to self-improve indefinitely without ever changing 
your mind.  It requires that you cannot change your mind through self-improvement.  Now, 
perfectly reasonable, intelligent people believe that eating meat is permissible; and they have 
good arguments for their views that are hard to dislodge.  Nonetheless, I suspect that the 
judgement is always ultimately due to shortcomings of information, sensitivity, coherence, 
and the like, and that proper reflection would – or, at least, could – lead dissenters to change 
their minds.  If I didn’t think this – if I thought that a reasonable interlocutor could hold this 
judgement without any such shortcomings, such that she could not, even in principle, come to 
change her mind through successful normative inquiry – then I would and should be 
correspondingly less confident that my own judgement is determinately correct after all.  To 
this extent, in taking a stance on a normative matter I’m committed to thinking that any 
disagreement with a reasonable interlocutor is not fundamental.44 
But suppose that we do fundamentally disagree about the permissibility of eating 
meat; and suppose that there is a determinate fact of the matter.  So, either my improvement* 
 
42 Similarly, if indeterminacy really seems beyond the pale, we should doubt the reasonableness of all the 
outlooks. 
43 If fundamental disagreement suffices for indeterminacy and there is a proper attitude to take towards 
indeterminate matters – e.g. suspension of judgement – then fundamental disagreement is unlikely to be 
widespread: if we fundamentally disagree, then we can both improve by suspending judgement; but if we both 
suspend judgement, then we no longer disagree; so the disagreement wasn’t fundamental after all.  
(Something similar goes given conciliationism about peer disagreement – see fn.35.)  Nonetheless, 
indeterminacy remains just as widespread. 
44 See also Lenman (2014: 241) and Rowland (2017).  Rowland argues that widespread fundamental moral 
disagreement would entail that our understanding of morality is “fatally flawed”. 
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set favours a determinately incorrect normative judgement, or yours does.  Suppose it is mine.  
It follows that I cannot come to the correct judgement on this matter by successfully engaging 
in normative inquiry.  I am in a kind of sceptical scenario.  (You might wonder how you could 
ever know that you’re not the one in the sceptical scenario.  So perhaps you’re in a sceptical 
scenario too.)  If there is widespread fundamental normative disagreement, such sceptical 
scenarios will be correspondingly widespread.  Now, the representationalist-realist is entitled 
to this diagnosis of the situation, where the expressivist is not.  But this hardly seems like an 
advantage.  Other things equal, the sceptical conclusion that perfectly reasonable normative 
agents are often hopelessly isolated from the determinate normative truth looks less appealing 
than the diplomatic, anti-sceptical conclusion that denies this.45 
The realist may respond that she can resist the sceptical conclusion, because she is 
entitled to extra resources: the realist can and should concede that we make higher-order 
normative judgements that guide the formation and maintenance of our normative outlooks 
(while disagreeing with the expressivist about the nature of such judgements), but the realist 
can also postulate an occult faculty of “intuition” or “perception” that we use to detect the 
normative facts.  If you’re happy with that, you might think this faculty can guide us to the 
truth when self-improvement fails.  But suffice it to say that the expressivist will not be 
impressed by any claim to dialectical advantage that makes use of such dubious resources.46 
 
 
45 Another salient option is give up absolutism in favour of relativism.  This is open to the expressivist, who can 
relativise normative correctness to (sets of) improvement* sets.  I work in the absolutist framework for 
simplicity (see fn.33). 
46 An identical dialectic plays out with regards to unstable-points, which also suffice (if reasonable) for 
indeterminacy on my account: (i) it’s not obvious that there are widespread unstable-points, and (ii) if 
unstable-points are widespread the accompanying proliferation of indeterminacy does not make matters 
worse.  On (i): let a flip-flopping series be an infinite series of distinct outlooks x1, x2, etc., each accessible from 
the last, such that [p] ∈ x1, [p] ∉ x2, [p] ∈ x3, [p] ∉ x4, and so on indefinitely; and let an improvement loop be a 
pair of outlooks, x1 and x2, each accessible from the other, such that [p] ∈ x1 and [p] ∉ x2.  For x to be an 
unstable-point for [p] requires, not just that x is a member of a flip-flopping series or improvement loop, but 
that every outlook accessible from x is so too.  This is a demanding constraint for an improvement* set to 
satisfy.  On (ii): if x is an unstable-point for [p] and there is a determinate fact of the matter, then x cannot 
settle on the determinately correct answer through successful normative inquiry.  Again, this sceptical 
diagnosis does not seem preferable to saying the matter is indeterminate. 
 The same goes vis-à-vis stable-points for both [p] and [¬p], if we say this suffices for indeterminacy 
(fn.27).  (i) If x values consistency, then eliminating a contradiction counts as an improvement by x’s lights.  So, 
if x is a stable-point for both [p] and [¬p], either x does not value consistency (and so is plausibly unreasonable) 
– or else all possible attempts to improve by eliminating the contradiction are systematically outweighed by 
compensating deteriorations by the lights of the other higher-order norms x endorses.  (ii) If there is a 
determinate fact of the matter, then self-improvement cannot dislodge a determinately incorrect judgement.  
This diagnosis does not seem preferable to saying the matter is indeterminate. 




If, as expressivists contend, normative thought and talk does not function to represent 
the world, it is puzzling how there can be correct or incorrect normative judgements.  I have 
argued here for a non-representational theory of normative (in)correctness, which explains 
what it is for a judgement to be (determinately) correct in terms of its stability through 
successful normative inquiry.  I have argued that this proposal vindicates the nature of 
normative inquiry as the expressivist conceives of it, leaves sufficient room for my own 
fallibility, and does not imply a problematic asymmetry between my outlook and others.  I 
conclude with two important clarifications. 
First, we should not confuse this account of what makes the judgement [eating meat 
is wrong] correct with an account of what makes eating meat wrong.47  The latter is a first-
order normative issue.  What makes eating meat wrong, if indeed it is, is the impact of animal 
husbandry on the environment and the animals, etc.; not anything to do with the stability of 
the corresponding judgement under improvement.  We should only amalgamate the 
questions if we endorse a deflationary account of normative correctness; and this is exactly 
what we are not doing if we go for the theory of normative (in)correctness developed here. 
Second, this is a theory of correctness for normative judgements; not a theory of truth for 
normative sentences.  It is natural to extend the account, by explaining sentential truth in terms 
of the expression of correct judgements.  Indeed, I am optimistic that the expressivist will be 
able to “earn the right” to a truth-conditional semantics for normative discourse on this basis.  
But this is an extension of the project, and not something I’ve defended here. 
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